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Mar 26, 1966 Date:  3/26/1966 EventName:  After Action Report Det. A-113 CreatedBy:  J. C. "Jetstream Skeeter" Cooper Source:  National Archives(Steve Sherman) Category:  Award/Medal Location:  RVN Description:  REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSIFIED IAW NND913546 06/16/03 CONFIDENTIAL COMPANY A 1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES APO San Francisco 96331 28 March 1966 SUBJECT: After Action Report TO: Commanding Officer 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) 1st Special Forces APO US Forces 96331 1. Enclosed is the After Action/Area Assessment Report for Detachment A-113, in six (6) cop-ies as required by USARPAC message, ARP 8412, dtd 9 June 1964, subject: Debriefing of Spe-cial Action Forces (U). 2. The overall classification on this report is CONFIDENTIAL. Wilbert Stitt Jr. Captain, Infantry Detachment Commander 8 Incl 1 - Detachment Roster 2 - Area Assessment 3 - Administration 4 - Intelligence 5 - Operations and Training 6 - Communications 7 - Logistics 8 - Civil Affairs/Psy Ops Inclosure 1 (Detachment Roster) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, dtd 28 March 1966. NAME Grade JOB Reason for Rtn to Okinawa Stitt, Wilbert Jr CPT Det Co Bee, Kenyon W. 1st LT XO Davidson, O’Neil MSG E-8 Op SGT Admin (10 Dec 65) West, Daniel R. MSG E-8 Op SGT Cooper, Gail F. SSG E-6 Lt Wpns Wilson, Gerald C. SFC E-7 Intel SGT Admin (23 Dec 65) Pecoraro, James G. SFC E-7 Hv Wpns Wiese, Fred D. SFC E-7 Snr Medic Everett, James F. SFC E-7 Rad Op Spv Mounts, Carl T. SSG E-6 Jr Medic Russell, Francis E. SFC E-7 Engr Blue, Richard E. SGT E-5 Rad Opr Dykstra, Thomas M. SP4 E-4 Demo Inclosure 2 (Area Assessment) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, dtd 28 March 1966. 1.(C) General: a. Mission: The mission of Detachment A-113 was to recruit, train and employ in combat operations a MIKE (Nung) Force of up to 600 Chinese (Nung) soldiers indigenous to the Re-public of Vietnam. The mission of the MIKE Force was: (1) Reinforcement of a threatened CIDG Camp area or to a CIDG area under attack. (2) Relief of a besieged CIDG Force. (3) Temporary replacement for combat ineffective units. (4) Reconnaissance to locate Viet Cong targets. (5) DZ/LZ selection, marking and securing to infiltrate or exfiltrate other units. (6) Act as an immediate reaction combat force. (7) Act as security during the initial stages of Camp development. b. Location of Detachment: Detachment A-113 was billeted with and received logistical and administrative support from Detachment C-1, 5th Special Forces Group, in Danang, RVN. Dan-ang is a coastal city located in Quang Nam Province approximately 400 miles northeast of Sai-gon in the I Corps CTZ. 2.(U) The Enemy: See Inclosure 4 (Intelligence). 3.(C) Security and Police Units and paramilitary units in the area: a. Dependability and reliability of existing local government authorities: The National Police, on occasion, were contacted concerning disciplinary matters and personnel of the Nung Force who were absent. This agency proved quite dependable in these matters as did the Quan Canh and other government officials contacted in the Danang area. b. Composition, identification and strength: This information was not available to the mem-bers of Detachment A-113. c. Organization, armament and equipment: Information of this nature could not be obtained by this Detachment. d. Degree of training, morale, efficiency and combat effectiveness: Observation of the con-duct of operations by police units and paramilitary units in the Danang area indicated that al-though the morale seemed high, the efficiency and combat effectiveness of these units is ques-tionable. e. Utilization effectiveness of informers: This information is not known. (See inclosure 4.) f. Influence on and relations with local population: The influence of the Security Units on the local populace was such that positive actions were achieved with little force and a good relation-ship between the elements exists. g. Security measures over public utilities and government installations: Physical security by both military and national police is maintained on official residences, government building, elec-trical power and water facilities, and along main arteries. (Highways and railroads.) Check points are established along main routes of communications. 4.(C) Civil Government: a. Control and restrictions, such as: (1) Documentation: Identification cards are strictly enforced, and in the case of males draft cards are also required. (2) Rationing: There is no system of rationing established in the Danang area. (3) Travel and movement restrictions: Travel or movement from an area was prohibited unless required papers (i.e., travel request and approval), were in order. In certain cases, special permission is required, usually from the District Chief’s office. (i.e., travel out of the district or province). (4) Blackout and curfews: Curfew in the Danang City area was from 2100 to 0500 hours for U.S. personnel. All establishments such as restaurants, bars and places of entertainment were closed during these hours. On occasion, based on the Mayor’s or higher official’s decision, the city was off limits to all military personnel. The eastern portion of the city was off limits to all civilian personnel after 1900 hours due to the location of military installations there. b. Current value of money, wage scale: The legal rate of exchange presently is 118 piasters to one U.S. Dollar. The wage scale for indigenous personnel employed by the U.S. Government is on a scale as follows: For unskilled laborers, the pay is 40 piasters per day to 300 piasters per day for skilled labor. This generally coincided with the civilian pay scale. c. The extent and effect of the black market: Since the U.S. Military buildup black marke-teering has flourished in nearly all aspects of commerce, measures to suppress black marketeer-ing have been put into effect with little success. This has the effect of raising both salaries and the cost of goods within the Danang area. d. Political restrictions: There are no apparent political restrictions within the Danang area. e. Religious restrictions: There are no religious restrictions within the Danang area. f. The control and operations of industry, utilities, agriculture and transportation; industry, utilities and agriculture are for the most part government controlled. There are, however, some transportation facilities that are owned by individuals. g. Effectiveness or power of civil government (Province, District or Village Hamlet as ap-propriate): Within the Danang area, the Civil Government exerts considerable influence over the civilian populace. During the period of time that Detachment A-113 spent in this area there were no overt demonstrations against the civil government nor was there any indication that a conflict existed between the civil government and the populace. h. Tax paid to the enemy by the local populace. List type and amount: This information was not accessible to the members of this Detachment. 5.(C) Civilian population within Province, District, and Village Hamlets: a. Basic racial stock and physical characteristics: (1) Ethnic groups, features, dress and habits: The inhabitants of the Danang Area are predominantly lowland Vietnamese interspersed with people of Chinese origin. The dress is typi-cally that of the Vietnamese city dweller as are the methods of expression used by these people. (2) Significant variations from the norm: There are no significant variation from the norm. b. Standard of living and cultural (education) levels: (1) There are no notable variations from the average in the level of education attained and the standard of living of the inhabitants of the Danang Area. (2) Class Structure: The class structure of the Vietnamese within the Area seemed based upon wealth, social and military stature. The greatest majority of the population occupied the unskilled worker class, a lesser amount occupied the skilled worker class which formed another segment of the population. The high ranking military was still another class. c. Health and Medical Standards: (1) Common diseases: The most common illnesses consisted of respiratory infections, eye infections, gastrointestinal ailments, venereal diseases and dietary deficiencies along with malaria. There were no unusual reactions to the standard treatment given for the above illnesses. The main cure, however, consisted of initiating projects of insect and rodent control and apply-ing stringent requirements for personal cleanliness and police of all facilities especially latrines and shower areas. One medic was assigned the responsibility of insuring that the mess hall re-mained in a high state of police. (2) Standards of public health: The standard of public health within the Area is fair. Many diseases are prevalent and a great segment of the population suffers from malnutrition. (3) Medical facilities and personnel to include total number of patients treated by your detachment medics: The Medical facilities present in the Area consisted of Special Forces facili-ties, Marine and Navy facilities, a Vietnamese Army Hospital and civilian hospitals. These facili-ties were all adequately staffed. The medics of this detachment treated a total of 4,027 patients during the TDY period. (4) Potable water supply: A potable water supply was available from Detachment C-1 which was adequate for the needs of the Nung Force. (5) Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment: There was no shortage of any medical supplies due to the location of the detachment adjacent to the C-Detachment. (6) Adequacy and reliability of all types of medical evacuations: The medical evacuation facilities are inadequate and unreliable due to a seeming reluctance of Vietnamese pilots to fly in inclement weather which was the case during the whole of the TDY period. Medical evacua-tions, however, were always accomplished but never on a timely basis. d. Religion: (1) Religion plays a definite role in shaping the thoughts of the individual Vietnamese. On religious holidays everything comes to a halt for its observance and resumes only when the holiday passes. The chief religion was Buddhism but the Chinese, who for the most part were ancestor worshippers, observed all of the Buddhist holidays. (2) Religious divisions. Major and minor religious groups: The major religious division was Buddhism with Chinese ancestor worship and animism forming the minor segments of re-ligious beliefs. 6.(C) Potential Targets: a. Railroads: Railroads within the Danang area were not used for inter-Province travel but only for the shuttle of materials within secure installations (Danang Airbase). This railroad was kept in good repair but had no effect whatever upon inter-Province commerce or travel. b. Telecommunications: The communications facilities located at the Danang Airbase form a lucrative target for any attack, however, diagrams of these facilities were not available to this detachment. c. POL: There was one (1) Shell Oil Company storage facility in the Danang Area. The larg-est POL storage facility was maintained by the Danang Airbase. d. Electric power: The number of hydroelectric power plants, public utility plants, location and wattage produced is not known. e. Military storage and supply: Military supplies for Special Forces A-Teams in the field are stored and supplied by Detachment C-1. These supplies are transported from the SFOB at Nha Trang by aircraft to the C-Detachment in Danang and from this location by aircraft to the A Team locations. There are no known underground storage areas. f. Military headquarters and installations: Detachment C-1 is located adjacent to the Danang Airbase and occupies a building complex made of wooden structures with concrete floors. This complex is adequate only to billet the members of the C-detachment and only a few of the mem-bers of A Teams who are in the Danang Area for rest. g. Highways: The most important highway in the Danang Area is Highway 1. This is an all weather highway approximately 16 feet wide. The highway has an earth base and in places a macadam surface. The maximum legal speed in this area is 20 MPH. h. Inland waterways, lakes, canals: The East Danang River is the chief inland waterway in the area. This river is used by many sampans and medium sized US Navy ships. At its widest point, the river is approximately 800 meters, the depth is unknown. There is one bridge that spans the river and a ferry operated by US Marines. i. Airfields and seaports: (1) The Danang Airfield is one of the Republic of Vietnam’s major and busiest airfields. It has all macadam surfaced runways and will accommodate all types of Air Force aircraft. All fuel storage tanks of the airfield of the collapsible, above ground, types. A traffic tower is pres-ent along with sufficient navigation and lighting equipment to make this an efficiently run air-field. The number of hangers is not known. (2) Seaports: Danang has a limited port facility. There are no berthing facilities and goods have to be shuttled from the ship anchored in the harbor to the shoreline. The principle imports for the Danang area consists of foodstuffs. j. Bridges: There is one major bridge in the area. This is presently under construction, but when completed will handle two way traffic between the city of Danang and Danang-East. There is no bypass for this bridge and the only other way to cross the river is by a ferry operated by US Marines. This bridge spans the East Danang River. 7.(U) Weather: a. Precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, visibility and seasonal changes: During the mon-soon season, the period covered by this report, there was a cloud cover and visibility condition that hampered military air operations constantly. The temperature ranged in the low 70s. Rains were infrequent but came in torrents that tended to undermine the already inadequate roads. b. Wind speed and direction: This information is now known. 8.(C) Terrain: a. General: The terrain in the I Corps Area is generally mountainous with dense vegetation. There are few coniferous trees with deciduous trees, bamboo, spiny bamboo and elephant grass to a height of 10 to 12 feet being the most abundant. Water is not a problem as there are numer-ous streams throughout the area that, for the most part, are fordable the whole of the year. b. Barriers to movement: The only barriers to movement are several unfordable streams, dense elephant grass and the densely vegetated mountains. Movement by motor vehicle is im-possible. c. The seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility: The seasons play a major role as far as visibility and the trafficability of the terrain are concerned. During the rainy season the visibility drops to only a few feet and movement is greatly hampered. During the dry season visi-bility is good and movement much easier. 9.(C) Logistics capability of the area: a. Availability of food: There was an adequate amount of food available within the area. This, however, was brought in to the Danang Area aboard boats which increased the price of it greatly. There was no shortage of fruits or vegetables. b. Agriculture capability: there is no limit to the agricultural capability of the Danang area. All of the ingredients for a successful agricultural program are present. c. Type and availability of transportation of all categories: Highway 1, an improved highway and the East Danang River form the major arteries out of the Danang area. d. Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing: The facilities in the Danang Area for the repair of clothing and equipment are lim-itless. e. Supplies locally available to include type and amount: The only supplies purchased locally and from the economy consists of foodstuffs, which are in adequate supply, presently, for the in-stallations in the area. f. Enemy supply sources: It is generally believed that the Viet Cong received much of their supplies through taxation of the populace in outlying areas. This is verified by intelligence re-ports. 10.(C) Personalities: a. USOM - USIS: Not known. b. Camp CO: LT1 Lao Hac (Presently lives in the Danang area with his family. Originally came from North Vietnam. Is of Chinese extract and has little control of Nung Force.) c. Province Chief: Not known. d. District Chief: Not known. e. Village Chief: Not known. f. Hamlet Chief: Not known. g. Interpreters: Le Binh, Huynh A, Quai, All three of these interpreters work for the Nung Force, are of Chinese descent and are reliable. h. Other persons of note: Nhjia Loi (Food procurer in the Danang Area). 11.(C) Problem areas encountered in developing area study: The document that required an area assessment in the detailed form that this area assessment is in was received after 25 January 1966. The detachment departed the Republic of Vietnam on 8 February 1966. Due to the de-tachment’s mission and the events that took place during this time (TET and increased VC ac-tivity), there was insufficient time to adequately research materials and explore sources to gain the required information. An After Action report in accordance with the requirement that pre-ceded the letter of 16 January 1966 was prepared while the detachment was still in RVN. 12.(U) Conclusions: All detachments that proceed TDY to the Republic of Vietnam should be equipped with a copy of the present requirement for After Action Reports. 13.(U) Recommendations: That during pre-deployment training all detachments be briefed on the present requirement for After Action Reports by the Group Area Study Officer. Inclosure 3 (Administration) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, dated 28 March 1966. 1.(C) Maintenance of Indigenous Unit Strength: a. Strength: In accordance with the Detachment’s mission, the main administrative activities conducted were direct supervision of all administrative, medical, supply, transportation, and per-sonal affairs matters of the 500 man Nung Reaction Forces and the 100 man civilian service sec-tion. Along with these duties were the responsibilities of fulfilling requirements from Detach-ment C-1, SFOB in Nha Trang and MACV Headquarters in the form of reports, accounting of monies, and written compliance with various communications. Other significant administrative activities consisted of detachment personnel affairs. b. Personnel records and reports: Personnel records were maintained on all indigenous per-sonnel assigned to the Nung Force. These records contained information relative to the soldier’s date of birth, place of birth, family data, places of residences and a brief resume. A daily strength status report was prepared and forwarded to Detachment C-1. Additionally, a bi-monthly strength report was submitted to Detachment C-1. c. Replacements: Personnel for the Nung Force were recruited for a year by personnel from Detachment C-1. This program served to recruit the initial members of the Force and presently serves to furnish replacements. Command positions are given to those soldiers who have shown that they can assume the responsibilities of those positions. This fact has to be attested to by the Australian or American platoon leader of the soldier. Several systems of punishment are applied. One consists of turning the soldier over to the ARVN if he fails to meet the disciplinary require-ments or standards of proficiency desired. The second is fine the soldier or to reduce him in rank for lesser offenses. The disciplinary standards parallels those of US Forces. d. Civilian personnel: There is a sufficient Chinese population in the Danang area to satisfy the requirement for Chinese civilian personnel. From these resources are drawn personnel for the Guard Platoon of the Nung Force, Cooks, Clerks and drivers. The hiring of these personnel, since the Nung Force pay is slightly higher than the average, is quite simple. e. Development and maintenance of morale: The Nungs have a long and glorious history which makes the present members of the Force proud. This history alone is a source of pride. Good pay, adequate food and living conditions, strict discipline and fair treatment tended to raise the morale and efficiency of the Nung Soldiers. A letter requesting that an awards system be set up by ARVN was submitted. This was in an attempt to make the Nung Soldier realize that the government of the Republic of Vietnam appreciates his effort and would reward him when he performed well. f. Discipline: Disciplinary measures were imposed by all echelons beginning with the Squad Leader up to the Battalion Commander. The degree of punishment that could be given was graduated from extra duty up to a fine and dismissal from the Force. There was an obvious re-spect for military authority and strict discipline. g. Approximate cost to run camp per month: The Nung Reaction Force was authorized to spend a total of 3,100,000$VN ($27,000.00 USD) monthly under cost code 904, which is a spe-cial cost code for Nung Forces under the CIDG Finance program. The main expenditures were the three following categories: Nung Civilian Payroll, Subsistence, Nung Payroll, and necessary local purchases. 2.(C) U.S. Special Forces: a. The location of Detachment C-1 at the Danang Airbase was ideal in the sense that nearly all of the usual conveniences were available. There was a free mail service, free movies, ade-quate recreational facilities, Chapels and several PBXs available. b. Decorations and Awards: Captain Wilbert Stitt Jr. - Combat Infantryman Badge, VN Parachutist Badge, Bronze Star Medal Meritorious Service, Air Medal. SSG Carl T. Mounts - Combat Infantryman Badge, VN Parachutist Badge. SGT Richard Blue - VN Parachutist Badge. SP4 Thomas M. Dykstra - VN Parachutist Badge, Combat Infantryman Badge. SFC Francis E. Russell - VN Parachutist Badge c. Graves registration: N/A 3.(U) General: a. Inprocessing: There were no problems encountered during in processing. b. Outprocessing: There were no problems encountered during out processing. 4.(U) Lessons Learned: Timely accomplishment of administrative details adds greatly to the mo-rale of the Force. 5.(U) Conclusions: That there are many administrative requirements inherent to the Nung force. 6.(U) Recommendations: That any detachment assigned to command the Nung Force study all available 5th SFG (Abn) regulations. Inclosure 4 (Intelligence) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, Dated 18 February 1966. 1.(C) Enemy: a. Composition, identification, and strength: Main Force: QUANG NAM STRENGTH LOCATION Quang Da Prov Regt CP 150 ZC120640 341st Co 100 AT980530 343rd Co 120 AT950620 345th Co 100 BT030550 347th Co 120 AT860580 515th Demolitions Co 100 AT850770 Chu Dong Bn 580 AT970290 Local Force: 29th Bn (Unconfirmed) AT880620 7th Bn (Unconfirmed) BT120460 H31 Co 60 ZC195535 H40 Co 100 AT990530 H41 Co 120 AT880710 H42 Co 70 AT895535 H52 Co 100 AT995470 100th Co 100 AT855855 Da Nang City Plt 30 AT800680 Militia/Guerrillas 2000 --------- b. Organization, armament, and equipment: Unknown c. Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness: Unknown d. Operations: VC activity in Quang Nam Province has increased greatly during the past three months. 120mm Mortar fire was received on Danang Airbase during the month of January and there is a higher rate of Marine contacts with VC units. Special Forces presently has no commitment in this province. e. Enemy unit areas of responsibility: Unknown. f. Logistical support to include: (1) Installations and facilities: Unknown. (2) Supply and commo liaison routes: Unknown. (3) Methods of troop movements: Viet Cong troops within the Quang Nam Province travel by foot. g. Past and current reprisal actions: Unknown. h. Peculiarities in methods of operation: The actions of the Viet Cong in Quang Nam Prov-ince do not differ from what is considered the norm. i. Ethnic origin: The Viet Cong in the Quang Nam Province are generally lowland Vietnam-ese and Montagnards. 2.(U) Collection: a. Describe in detail the operational cycle (planning, spotting, recruiting, etc.). How did nets operate? Was there US involvement? If so, to what degree, how, etc.? If not, why? were the nets successful or not?: The intelligence role of Detachment A-113 was very limited due to the Detachment’s and the Nung Reaction Force’s missions. All intelligence that brought about a tactical commitment came from Special Forces/CIDG Camps in the field. The following intelli-gence efforts, however, were conducted. (1) Two squad size elements were trained in reconnaissance and surveillance type work. This covered long range reconnaissance, surveillance reporting of enemy and terrain informa-tion, selection and marking of landing zones (air supply and heliborne troop). (2) The mission of these elements were to find enemy forces, their bases caches and routes they used, for the Reaction Force to disrupt and destroy. Their mission included being used as advanced guard (scout element) of main force in the movement to contact, and when ac-companied by USSF personnel ground/air control to direct tactical air strikes on enemy targets in isolated areas, or in support of friendly forces. (3) Due to these elements’ unique mission they were well rehearsed in route, zone and area reconnaissance and the proper detailed reporting methods. Sketching was covered, and the code words COCOA and SALUTE stressed. Emphasis was placed on timely reporting during the training. b. Early Warning: Not applicable. c. Funds: Not applicable. d. How was information evaluated? How was reliability of source determined? How was information confirmed? Not applicable. e. Coordination and Liaison. How was it conducted? Successful or not? Why? With what agencies (Military, CIDG, SDC, Local Police, MSS)? With what agencies of other countries (New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Korea, etc.)? With US Intelligence Agencies (CIA, ONI, OSI, SWIAT, CID)?: Not applicable. f. Prisoners of War: All POW’s taken by the Nung Force were turned over to the A De-tachment in whose area that the Nungs were operating. All questioning of these POW’s was done by personnel of the Camp and was not entered in to by members of the Nung Force. g. Captured Documents and Material: All documents and materials captured were turned in to the A Detachment in whose area the Nungs operated. h. Aerial Surveillance: Aerial photography was obtainable from Detachment C-1 and served a good purpose in the planning of operations. i. Receipt and Dissemination of Intelligence Information: Agent nets in the Special Forces Camps provided information and intelligence for the Reaction Force, thru the C-1 S-2. Upon commitment and the arrival of the Reaction Force at Camp Sites they were briefed by the re-spective A Detachment Commander, or detachment intelligence sergeant. In the case of relief of a besieged camp or area, the Force was briefed by the C-1 S-2 prior to departure from Camp McBride, Danang. After commitment tactical information was provided by the elements of the Reaction Force or CIDG force in contact. On occasion, SEI requirements were placed on the Reaction Force by the C Detachment, in order to confirm “other” sources of information in a given area. There was no intelligence effort (agent nets, etc.) on a current basis, conducted by Detachment A-113 due to its primary base of operations’ location and the mission being that of a reaction force for all of the Special Forces Camps in I Corps. No combat operations were con-ducted in the Danang Area as USMC Units has the security responsibility for this area. j. General observations and comments of detachment personnel. None. 3.(U) Counterintelligence: a. Security of classified material. Unusual procedures that failed or succeeded. How? Why?: This detachment did not maintain classified materials. (1) Within the camp. N/A (2) In the field: Classified material carried to the field (SOI, etc) was maintained on the person of the individual responsible for it. (3) Access: Access to all classified material by members of the detachment was on a “need to know” basis. b. Personnel Security: (1) All background checks for indigenous employees of the Nung Force were made by Detachment C-1 through the LLDB and the National Police Headquarters. The method used was adequate. (2) The background checks mentioned above applied to the whole of the Nung Force. c. Enemy efforts to penetrate camp: None known. 4.(U) Unusual Intelligence Missions and Techniques: None 5. Problem areas: There were no problems encountered in the intelligence effort by this Detach-ment. Intelligence was provided by the C Detachment S-2 and the A Camps that were sup-ported. Inclosure 5 (Operations and Training) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, dated 28 March 1966. 1.(C) Mission: The mission of Detachment A-113 was to recruit, train and employ in combat a Reaction Force consisting of 600 men of Chinese (Nung) origin. 2.(C) Training: An initial four (4) weeks basic training phase was conducted followed by an ad-vanced training phase which included actual combat operations and a retraining phase conducted as a result of the deficiencies noted on actual operations. All training encompassed the following subject: a. Immediate action drill. b. Scouting and patrolling techniques including night training. c. Land navigation and map reading. d. Evasion and Escape. e. Securing DZs and LZs. f. Combat intelligence. g. Demolitions. h. Search operations. i. conduct of raids. j. Occupation of clandestine assembly areas. k. LMGs and Mortars. l. Conduct of hasty defense and withdrawal. m. Communications (including air to ground). n. Heliborne operations. o. Infiltration techniques. p. Selection and marking of DZ and LZs. q. Terminal guidance for air drop and air landed operations. r. Night Operations. 3. Operations: (See TAB A MOPSUM). 4.(U) Airborne Operations: a. Did you have helicopter and/or aircraft support for routine logistics and administration?: No. b. Did you participate in heliborne or airborne operations?: The chief means of transporta-tion for the Reaction Force was by helicopters which were furnished by the Corps Tactical Zone Commander. A classified air operation was conducted on the average of one per week during the entire period of TDY. c. Close air support was not used. 5.(C) Plans: A portfolio of emergency drop and landing zones around and near Special Forces Camps in I Corps were maintained by S-3, Detachment C-1, for the purpose of the timely em-ployment of the Nung Force on reaction missions. Photos of these camps are enclosed at Tab B. Maps of the Camp areas are enclosed at Tab C. 6.(C) Training: a. MOS 11B4S - 11C4S. (1) What foreign weapons did you have to work with? None (2) What US weapons did you have to work with? (a) US Carbine, cal 30 M2 (b) BAR (c) Machine gun, cal 30 (d) Pistol, cal 45 (e) M-79 Grenade Launcher (f) 60mm Mortar (g) M-16 Rifle (3) No rifle grenades were used. (4) Instructions were given in all of the above weapons. (5) The only night firing devices that were used were the ones for the 81mm Mortars lo-cated with Detachment C-1. The firing of these mortars was also the responsibility of the Reac-tion Force personnel. b. MOS 11F5S. (1) In addition to assisting the Detachment Commander in the overall operation of the Reaction Force the Operation Sergeant’s duties also included the writing of Combat Patrol Or-ders and After Action Reports. (2) During the briefing and debriefing of patrols maps and other graphic training aids were used. Emphasis, reemphasis and clarity were stressed due to having to communicate through an interpreter. 7.(U) Lessons Learned: proper planning and coordination are essential ingredients to a success-ful operation. TABS A - MOPSUM’s B - Photos of Camps C - Maps of Camp Areas (Tabs not present) Inclosure 6 (Communications) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, Dated 28 March 1966. 1.(C) General: a. Four types of radios were available for use in the detachments. These were the HT-1, AN/PRC 10, AN/PRC 25 and the AN/GRC 109. b. The radio operators were SFC James F. Everett and SGT Richard Blue. 2.(C) Communication with Detachment C-1. a. Detachment number: C-1. b. Location (Corps, area, and town): I Corps, Danang, RVN. c. On extended field operations that AN/GRC 109 was used to communicate with Detach-ment C-1. Normally two contact times per day were scheduled. (1) AN/GRC 109: (a) How many contacts daily? Normally two when on extended field operations only. (b) Antenna(s) used/type: L shaped. (c) Distance transmitted? Approximately 90 kilometers. 3.(C) No other radio contacts were made by detachment personnel. 4.(U) Communications to SFOB from “A” detachment: None. 5.(C) Patrol communications: a. Radio used: AN/GRC 109 b. Type of net: Command c. Distance reached with radio: 90 kilometers d. Type of antenna used: L shaped e. Ground to air communications: PRC 25 on frequency 49.4. f. Operated back to Detachment C-1 in Danang. 6.(U) Power source: a. Generator. b. Camp power. 7.(U) Maintenance of Communication Equipment. All communications equipment was main-tained by USSF radio operators on a scheduled basis. 8.(U) Evaluation of SOI: The SOI used was secure and adequate. 9.(U) Evaluation of frequencies: The frequencies used were adequate. 10.(U) Supply: Adequate. 11.(U) Crypto: Adequate 12.(U) Internal Camp Communications: Not applicable. 13.(U) Indigenous Radio Interference: None. Inclosure 7 (Logistics) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, dated 28 March 1966. 1.(C) Supply: a. All requests for supplies were made through Detachment C-1 on the standard requisition forms. These supplies were receipted for and issued to the Nung soldiers as initial issues or on a direct exchange basis. Clothing forms were maintained and frequent inspections held. b. Detachment A-113 assumed the responsibility for the building of the Nung Camp portion of the C Detachment Compound in Danang East during the month of December. All materials were furnished by the C Detachment. For the most part of the labor used in this construction was civilian but on occasion Nung soldiers were used. 2.(U) In-Country Supply and Maintenance: a. Detachment A-113 was quartered with Detachment C-1 and all of the maintenance facili-ties of this detachment were available to supply materials and maintain detachment equipment. b. Vehicles: There were five (5) vehicles assigned to the Reaction Force and these, because of the location of the detachment kept in a high state of repair. c. Ordnance: There was no shortage of repair parts. d. Ammunition: Requests for ammunition were filled immediately upon request. e. The maintenance support rendered this detachment was adequate. Inclosure 8 (Civil Affairs - Psy/Ops) to After Action Report Detachment A-113, dated 28 March 1966. Due to the nature of the Reaction Force’s mission, no Civic Action projects were undertaken and all psychological operations were directed at the Reaction Force soldier in an attempt to make him aware of his connection with the government of the Republic of Vietnam and his re-sponsibilities toward that government. These efforts took the forms of movies, lectures and an awards system that included Vietnamese Army ribbons.